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ment. [d. at 2434-35. Thus, the federal 
government can pre-empt state regula-
tion and offer incentives to the states as 
a means of encouraging them to adopt 
regulatory schemes, but it cannot di-
rect the states to provide for disposal of 
waste generated within their borders. 
[d. at 2435. The Court held that the 
take title provision was not a constitu-
tional method of achieving regional 
self-sufficiency in waste disposal. [d. 
By holding that the "take title" pro-
vision of the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy AmendmentActof1985 
violated the United States Constitu-
tion, the Court reinforced the sover-
eignty ofthe States that is reserved to 
them by the Tenth Amendment. Thus, 
when enacting environmental legisla-
tion, Congress must be careful not to 
infringe on States' power by directing 
their activities. Although disposing of 
radioactive waste is a serious problem, 
Congress must remain within Consti-
tutional bounds when creating more 
innovative inducements for the States 
to adopt its regulatory schemes. 
- Kristen L. OifJ 
Derricott v. State: MARYLAND DE-
CLARESREASONABLE SUSPICION 
FORALA WFUL "STOP AND FRISK" 
REQUIRES MORE THAN MATCH-
ING CHARACTERISTICS OF A 
DRUG COURIER PROFILE. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
in Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582, 611 
A.2d 592 (1992), held that the reason-
able suspicion required for a valid 
search of an individual is not satisfied 
by simply matching the characteristics 
of a statistically-based drug courier 
profile. Applying a totality ofthe cir-
cumstances analysis, the court held 
that a police officer must be able to 
articulate reasons beyond the profile 
that would warrant an invasion of 
someone's Fourth Amendment rights. 
On June 3, 1988, Corporal Michael 
Thomas ("Corporal Thomas") of the 
Maryland State Police observed a 
brown sports car driving at excessive 
speed on Interstate 270. Corporal Tho-
mas pulled the car over without inci-
dent and the driver of the vehicle, 
Darone A. Derricott, ("Derricott") 
readily handed over his driver's li-
cense and registration. During this 
encounter, Corporal Thomas observed 
that Derricott was young, black, and 
wearing gold jewelry. He also ob-
served a ''beeper'' on the dash and 
various papers containing telephone 
numbers lying on the passenger seat. 
A check of Derricott's license and 
registration revealed no irregularities. 
Despite this information and the fact 
that the Corporal had not observed any 
suspicious behavior by Derricott, he 
requested backup and a "drug dog" to 
perform a "sniff search" of Derricott 
and his vehicle. Corporal Thomas' sole 
justification for this action was that his 
earlier observations ofDerricott matched 
the State Police drug courier profile. 
When the back-up arrived, Corporal 
Thomas ordered Derricott to exit his 
vehicle and conducted a patdown which 
revealed no weapons. Corporal Tho-
mas then searched the vehicle. The 
Corporal found and seized a cello-
phane bag containing what appeared to 
be cocaine and Derricott was arrested 
for possession of a controlled danger-
ous substance. 
Prior to trial in the Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County, Derricottmoved 
to suppress the drugs claiming they 
were the product of an unreasonable 
search and seizure contrary to his Fourth 
Amendment rights. After the motion 
was denied, Derricott waived his right 
to a jury trial and proceeded to trial 
before Judge McKenna on an agreed 
statement of facts. Judge McKenna 
found him guilty of possession of a 
controlled dangerous substance with 
intent to distribute, as well as speed-
ing. The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed. The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland granted certiorari to 
determine the reasonableness of the 
search under the Fourth Amendment. 
The state argued that the stop and 
search of Derricott was lawful based 
. upon the limited "stop and frisk" doc-
trine exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment as established in Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its progeny. 
Derricott, 327 Md. at 587, 611 A.2dat 
595. The court summarized the law 
regarding stop and frisk, noting that a 
lawful stop requires that an officer 
possess a reasonable, articulable sus-
picion of criminal activity. [d. Once 
an individual is lawfully stopped, an 
officer must have a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that the individual 
is armed and dangerous in order to 
justify a frisk. [d. A lawful search of 
the passenger compartment of an auto-
mobile for weapons demands the same 
level of suspicion and is limited to 
those areas to which an individual could 
gain immediate access to weapons. [d. 
The court proceeded to distinguish 
a Terry type search for weapons from a 
Belton search. Unlike Terry, Belton 
does not require suspicion, but instead 
authorizes an officer to search the inte-
rior of an automobile incident to a 
lawful arrest. [d. (citing New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981». Since 
the search ofDerricott's car was not the 
result of a lawful arrest, the court deter-
mined that Terry demanded an 
"evaluat[ion] [of] the totality of the 
circumstances to decide whether a rea-
sonable prudent person in [Corporal 
Thomas '] position would be warranted 
in believing that his safety or that of 
others was in danger." [d. 
The court first recognized that Cor-
poral Thomas' suspicions were based 
solely upon the fact that Derricott 
matched several aspects of a drug cou-
rierprofile. Id. at 588, 611 A.2d at 596. 
Noting that reliance upon a drug pro-
file does not give rise to any special 
legal significance, the court held that 
an officer must demonstrate how the 
observation of elements of the profile 
would lead a reasonable person to de-
termine that an individual is armed and 
dangerous. Id at 589, 611 A.2dat596. 
The court rejected the state's argument 
that a match to the "statistically-based 
profile" established by the police nar-
cotics section was sufficient in and of 
itself to establish a reasonable suspi-
cion justifying a search or frisk. [d. at 
591,611 A.2d at 597. 
23.2 I The Law For u m 37 
The court explained that such pro-
files were not susceptible to an objec-
tive test for reliability.' Id. Moreover, 
the state had failed to provide an analy-
sis of why the combination of profile 
characteristics presented to Corporal 
Thomas generated reasonable suspi-
cion that Derricott was armed and dan-
gerous. Id. The court maintained that 
the characteristics exhibited by 
Derricott were relatively common at-
tributes. Id. Therefore, the court con-
cluded, further justification was re-
quired to prevent unjust infringement 
upon the privacy rights of innocent 
travelers who coincidentally matched 
the profile. Id. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
adhered to well established Fourth 
Amendment prinCiples in Derricott v. 
State. In doing so, the court refused to 
allow faceless, statistic-wielding, bu-
reaucrats to determine exactly who will 
and who will not be protected by the 
Fourth Amendment. Moreover, al-
though the opinion makes little direct 
reference to race, the holding makes it 
clear that the court will refuse to allow 
law enforcement officials to use statis-
tics as a means to eviscerate the Fourth 
Amendment rights of African Ameri-
can citizens. 
- Laurie Ann Garey 
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